Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu left Mar-a-Lago last week with what most leaders would call a strategic success. In his fifth in-person meeting of 2025 with President Donald Trump, Netanyahu secured American alignment on the two files that matter most to Israel’s security: Hamas and Iran. The third — Turkey — remained conspicuously unresolved. That omission explains both the strength of the meeting and the risks embedded in it.
On Gaza, Trump erased lingering doubts. There will be no Phase 2, no reconstruction and no political horizon without Hamas disarmament. That declaration gives Israel continued freedom of action and removes pressure for a premature withdrawal from territory it currently controls. It also punctures the narrative that Washington is prepared to ease demands on Hamas in exchange for diplomatic momentum or international applause.
But clarity can also harden paralysis. A Gaza frozen between war and reconstruction risks becoming Hamas’ ideal operating environment. The longer Phase 2 remains theoretical rather than operational, the more time Hamas has to rearm, reassert dominance on the streets and suppress rivals. Hamas does not need legitimacy to survive; it needs time, fear and the absence of alternatives. A prolonged stalemate delivers all three.
International confidence is another casualty of delay. Phase 2 was never just about Israel and Hamas. It was meant to persuade donors, Arab states and multilateral institutions that Gaza had a future beyond endless war. If those actors conclude that Phase 2 has no realistic timeline, money will dry up, political attention will wander and the incentive to invest in post-Hamas governance will evaporate. In that vacuum, Hamas does not lose power — it consolidates it.
Iran presents a parallel dilemma. Trump’s signal that even a restart of Iran’s ballistic missile program — not just nuclear escalation — could justify an Israeli strike meaningfully strengthens deterrence. It closes a loophole Tehran has long exploited by advancing non-nuclear capabilities while staying below the nuclear threshold. Yet Trump also drew a boundary: He would support an Israeli strike, not participate in one. Iran may calculate that Israel will hesitate to act alone, betting that American focus will drift once another political crisis or diplomatic spectacle takes center stage. Deterrence without persistence invites calibrated defiance.
And then there is Turkey.
Netanyahu came to Mar-a-Lago hoping Trump would draw a firm line — no Turkish role in Gaza and no legitimization of Ankara’s backing of Syria’s new, ex-jihadist leadership. Instead, Trump offered ambiguity, wrapped in characteristic improvisation. His praise of Turkish President Recep Tayyip Erdogan, paired with teasing jabs at Netanyahu, left Ankara conspicuously unconstrained.
That matters because Turkey is not a side issue. It is significant regional actor positioned to exploit prolonged uncertainty in both Gaza and Syria. Ankara’s ambitions thrive on unresolved transitions and political vacuums. By leaving Turkey unresolved, Trump preserved flexibility for himself — but left Israel facing its most complicated regional counterweight without clear American backing.
Two out of three is the right headline. Hamas containment and Iran deterrence look settled, at least for now. But Turkey sits at the intersection of both files, a spoiler empowered by stalemate. Netanyahu secured alignment on principle at Mar-a-Lago. Whether that victory endures will depend on whether the unresolved third becomes a footnote — or the hinge on which the other two ultimately turn.
