Egyptian President Abdel Fattah al-Sisi has a serious problem. He needs to figure out how to navigate demands from President Donald Trump that Egypt accept Palestinian refugees from Gaza as part of Trump’s grand plan for the development of a “Middle East Riviera,” notwithstanding Egypt’s security and political concerns implicated by potential mass migration from Gaza to Egypt.
Sisi’s dilemma is aggravated by the Trump administration’s very public, heavy-handed tactics in dealing with international diplomacy issues. Much of what used to be spoken quietly behind closed doors is now broadcast openly to friends and foes in public interviews, social media postings and televised diplomatic meetings.
Egypt is the second-largest recipient of America’s ongoing military aid. Israel is the first. Egypt’s annual $1.5 billion from the U.S. accounts for nearly a quarter of the country’s military budget. Among other things, those U.S. dollars have been used to support Cairo’s significant military buildup in the Sinai Peninsula since Oct. 7, which everyone understands to be part of the country’s effort to keep its border closed to refugees.
Shortly after Trump announced his Gaza plan, which includes the resettlement of Gaza’s approximately 2 million residents in neighboring countries, both Egypt and Jordan rejected the idea, citing significant security and political concerns.
Egypt’s concerns are deeply rooted in its struggles with Islamist militancy. The Sinai Peninsula has been a hot spot for insurgent activities, many linked to groups ideologically aligned with factions in Gaza. Egypt fears that allowing a large influx of Gaza refugees could provide a foothold for extremist elements, potentially destabilizing the region further.
While Sisi wants to protect against the resurgence of radical Islamist influence within his country, he knows that Trump has not shied away from leveraging aid as a tool to achieve his foreign policy objectives. And $1.5 billion is a lot of leverage. That places Egypt in a dilemma: acquiesce to U.S. demands and risk internal security or uphold national interests and face potentially significant economic repercussions.
Which makes last week’s report in the Lebanese Al-Akhbar newspaper particularly interesting. According to the report — which as of this writing has not otherwise been confirmed — Sisi informed several Arab leaders that he is willing to temporarily relocate half a million residents of Gaza to a designated city in northern Sinai while Gaza reconstruction is pursued.
The Egyptian State Information Service denied the report and reiterated that “Egypt’s position is firm in its absolute and final rejection of any attempt to displace Palestinians” as part of any reconstruction effort. But what about voluntary relocations?
According to reports, a significant percentage of Gazans wanted to emigrate before the war. It is reasonable to assume that the percentage is much higher now. Focusing on those who would choose to leave, coupled with Egypt’s possible receptivity to some Gaza resettlement activity, may open an area for exploratory discussion with representatives of the Israeli government who have themselves been discussing day-after plans that include assisted departure of Palestinian residents from Gaza.
If the voluntary emigration numbers are sufficient, there may be room for a deal to be made.
